

4 October 73.

The flaw of studying history in the moments of great crises - revolutions especially, is to believe that all the extreme manifestations ~~that~~ we thought and act that appear in such times are the direct result of preceding events. Without denying that there must have been some tensions or very unfortunate developments that precipitated the crisis, I would propose that the extremes of the revolutionary experience are as much the product of the psychological hysteria of the ~~time~~<sup>moment</sup> (as mob action is for the sociologist) as of any firmly rooted movement towards fundamental change that can be found in the preceding period.

The moments of upheaval are the most fascinating for the historian because they seem to show change at its truest. But according to my calculus, the expressions of novelty that appear are not always true to the times in a large sense but rather only to a small group driven to say something in a situation of demand for grand declarations. The reasoning afforded to explain a crisis, at the moment it occurs, can be the construction overnight of any nimble wot who wishes to appear as prophet; and the element of interest that motivates the revolutionaries will usually be sublimated because of its materialistic character, its certain lack

of public comprehensibility, or because he <sup>is</sup> acting  
in really unaware of ~~his~~ <sup>not responsible for his</sup> ~~own~~ impulses.

This is not to say that things are not worked  
out during a revolution which are of great  
moment later on, but rather to suggest that  
those things which have lasting effect are ar-  
rived at during the ~~fast~~ mad whirl of  
events and are not deep causes of the revolutionary  
moment itself.

In effect, one is thrown into such a revolu-  
tionary circumstance despite the wishes of most  
any party, either due to some hard struggle  
between rival factions that erodes the basis of con-  
sensus (but neither party, in advance, being so  
calculatant ~~it~~ as to invite what actually comes to  
pass), or an unfortunate external force that destroys  
the power of the ruling group (and so simply opens  
the way to opportunism), or some risky course  
taken by the ruling group as a measure of getting  
over a short term crisis which ~~is~~ allows the seem-  
ingly of power to pass to some group not usually  
functioning on the public level, and ~~is~~ a dominant  
process of undermining the established power set in  
motion, which cannot be stopped.

To give causation to revolutions, therefore, I would

not look to the position but emerges during  
the negotiation, but to the power in the act

perceptions which come from some awareness  
of a social or political character. I would not

go all the way with some British's thinking of  
transition to say that a ~~fundamental~~ <sup>fundamental</sup> ~~socially~~ - ~~political~~

group finally decide to establish the old order. So do  
that would be to believe them as ~~with~~ <sup>separately</sup>

write group decisions there about them, rather than  
(not at the time) they are trying to emulate them. The

precipitation of the group comes perhaps from a  
wish the representatives outside are willing to take to

accelerate them into specific some resistance, but  
that they are ~~invariably~~ trying to bring about they

are trying to ~~gain~~ <sup>gain</sup> in way of ~~order~~ <sup>order</sup> to be kept  
put ~~and~~ <sup>in</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~area~~ <sup>area</sup> of ~~prophetic~~ <sup>prophetic</sup> ~~order~~

reminiscent which is kept in my form. Rather the answer  
is that the wish to look the possibility of greater ~~order~~ <sup>order</sup>

turning out to have been a bad one. My reasons  
we may later see with great clarity but what the

contingencies ~~that~~ <sup>there</sup> could not have had else  
they would have been much more ~~inconspicuous~~ <sup>inconspicuous</sup>.

There are ~~many~~ <sup>many</sup> ~~ways~~ <sup>ways</sup> of ~~assembling~~ <sup>assembling</sup> ~~groups~~ <sup>groups</sup>  
to the old order (you may recall) by ~~recourse~~ <sup>recourse</sup> to  
means, ~~but~~ <sup>but</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~old~~ <sup>old</sup> ~~order~~ <sup>order</sup> ~~is~~ <sup>is</sup> ~~not~~ <sup>not</sup> ~~to~~ <sup>to</sup> ~~be~~ <sup>to</sup> ~~restored~~ <sup>restored</sup>  
by ~~any~~ <sup>any</sup> ~~means~~ <sup>means</sup> ~~at~~ <sup>at</sup> ~~all~~ <sup>at</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~present~~ <sup>present</sup> ~~time~~ <sup>time</sup>. The ~~only~~ <sup>only</sup> ~~program~~ <sup>program</sup> of  
change of society by ~~these~~ <sup>these</sup> ~~means~~ <sup>means</sup> are ~~in~~ <sup>in</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~future~~ <sup>future</sup>

certainly as are those achieved by revolution, and it is the more important part of the historians' role to study & know these peaceful accommodations than to study & know the revolutions. What happens during the revolutions is as apt to be as irrelevant to the main directions of change as to explain them — albeit that the changes which the revolution sets in motion, almost unwittingly, may be of very great significance for what follows.

The quandary raised here is whether the anomalies of the pre-revolutionary situation, which might be resolved peacefully (and most often are) are resolved ~~in~~ during a revolution in a fashion which is commensurate to what one can judge would have happened had ~~the~~ change been wrought "peacefully," or whether the unforeseeable innovations of the Revolution ~~will~~ resolve the anomaly in greatly different fashions than one would have expected. Every revolution will have a combination of both, surely, but we can easily see in most revolutions that the most innovative proposals are wholly fantasy in terms of results, ~~and~~ while the pre-revolutionary but un-revolutionary mobile groups usually survive the extremes and realize much of what they wanted (albeit in different ways than they'd anticipated) in the post-revolutionary period.

In a certain way, the historian should be able to judge the quite un-revolutionary character of the "paradigm crisis" at the eve of the revolution, without any reference to the nature of the pre-revolutionary period which the spirits of the revolution soon proclaim. The entrance into the revolution, then, is a voyage into uncharted waters, a wondrous adventure that exemplifies the spontaneous creativity latent in men and society, as if a great social work of art; but its attractiveness is often more in the imaginativeness than in the practicality, and it is to the latter the historian must pay greatest heed over the long run.

—H—